Lecture by Prof Douglas Cairns, University of Edinburgh, GRK Mercator Fellow 2018/19: “Mental Conflict from Homer to Eustathius”
A blog post by Chiara Ferella.
After the Christmas break, on the first RTG’s plenary session of 2019, our Mercator Fellow, Prof Douglas Cairns, holder of the chair of classics at the University of Edinburgh, held a lecture on mental conflict in the Homeric poems and in their later reception, especially in Eustathius’ Homeric Commentaries. Mental conflict is defined as the situation that arises when a person is subjected to conflicting motives or impulses to act. In Homer, one common way of representing mental conflict is in terms of a relation between a person and his/her psychic organs (such as, his/her thymos or heart).
Cairns presented an empirical refutation of the standard opinion, initiated by Bruno Snell in his famous book The Discovery of Mind (English translation Oxford 1953). According to Snell, Homeric man is “a battleground of arbitrary forces and uncanny powers… the Homeric man has not yet awakened to the fact that he possesses in his own soul the source of his powers.” Snell argues for a multiplicity of psychic agents that preclude a unified sense of the person as an entire agent. As Arthur Adkins summarizes, “Homeric Man … has a psychology and a physiology in which the parts are more evident than the whole” (From the Many to the One, London 1970: 26).
In contrast, Cairns claimed that the apparent multitude of psychic organs needs to be treated as a family or system that exists to represent personal agency. Moreover, Cairns highlighted that psychic organs, by metonymy (in which aspect of physical body felt to play a role in mental functioning comes to serve as ways of referring to those functions) and in metaphors (mostly personification and reification), come to represent the phenomenology of psychological processes.
Thus, even though the person’s psychic organ is involved in a situation of mental conflict, the agent, namely the real subject pondering diverse courses of action or conflicting impulses is still the person as a whole (and not one of his/her psychic organs).
In the Homeric poems, a person ponders different options and impulses within one of his/her psychic organs, or he/she can do so also without any reference to his/her psychic organs. As Cairns showed, in the contest of a person pondering within his/her psychic organs, the adverbial reference to the psychic organ is simply a way to specify that the act of pondering takes place within the mental apparatus of the person. However, a psychic organ (often thymos) can itself reflect and deliberate. In this respect, Cairns focused on Hector’s monologue before his confrontation with Achilles (Il. 22.98ff.).
This episode is introduced by a formulaic address to Hector’s thymos. Whereas for Shirley Darcus such addresses to the thymos emphasize the distinct nature of person and thymos (Psychological and Ethical Ideas: What early Greeks say, Leiden 1995: e.g.58), Cairns highlighted, in contrast, that thymos functionally serves to intensify the agent’s thoughts. In other words, the agent’s address to the thymos and the agent’s deliberation in respect or within his/her thymos indicate the same process. This holds true even when the thymos is credited with some speech. Before articulating his final resolution, Hector presents his previous thoughts and pondered options for action as suggestions voiced in conversation by his thymos: “but why has my dear thymos said this to me in conversation?” However, no actual speech is ever attributed to the thymos in this or any other Homeric passages. More plausibly, formulae like that we find here are meant to characterise the thymos as a convenient source for the rejected options. But Hector is the only agent pondering possible alternatives and eventually coming to a decision: “if I go… Polydamas will be first to put a reproach upon me … Now since by my own recklessness I ruined my people, I feel shame before the Trojans” etc. (my emphasis).
Thus, although the thymos can function as a sort of partner in an internal conversation or mental conflict, it is not conceptualized as a separated agent of speech and deliberation. As Cairns compellingly concluded, even though Hector converses with his thymos, the deliberating agent is still Hector as an entire person. We have indeed a well-integrated personality that is able to wage options, consider responsibilities and take decisions.
The second major passage Cairns focused on was the episode where Odysseus is plotting harm for the Suitors and pondering whether to kill them (Od. 20.9ff.). Here Odysseus is said to have a heart that barks within him. The doings of the heart stand in metonymy for the emotional experience with which the organ is associated. Cairns maintained that Odysseus’ barking heart is a paradigm of motivational conflict, as was already recognised by Plato. This means that even though the heart is said to bark, the entity feeling emotions is not Odysseus’ heart, but rather Odysseus himself as a whole person. After the focus on the barking heart (kardiē), the subsequent lines refer to the thymos: Odysseus’ reflection on what to do occurs in his thymos. The shifts among heart, thymos and Odysseus himself serve to intensify the agent’s mental conflict. There is no functional difference between heart and thymos, just as there is no difference in agency between thymos and Odysseus. In fact, within less than five lines Odysseus can indifferently say “my thymos pondered this in my breast” and “this other and harder thing I ponder in my breast” (my emphasis). Which clearly indicates that Odysseus’ thymos is not conceptualized as a psychic entity distinct from the person, but is the pars pro toto indicating Odysseus himself as deliberating agent.
Finally, Cairns considered some passages of Eustathius’ Homeric commentaries to show that, in contrast to modern interpretations, the Byzantine author was aware that the addressee to a certain organ by a Homeric character does not imply a primitive conceptualization of the person’s psychology as fragmented. Although psychic organs are addressed in motivational conflicts in the Homeric poems, the real agent of deliberation is still the person as a whole. As Eustathius acknowledges, Homeric addressees to psychic organs such as heart or thymos are instances of figurative language. Or, more specifically: “‘Endure my heart’ is a synecdoche for ‘you, Odysseus…’ That is why a bit later he says ‘when you thought you were going to die’, where ‘you’ is clearly Odysseus.’’ (Comm. Od. 18. 223-4 Stallbaum).
As the subsequent discussion displayed, Cairns’ presentation raised a great array of questions dealing with concepts of soul and mind in Greek and other ancient cultures, the relationship between mind and body, the study of emotions, as well as of motivational conflict in ancient languages and culture. Above all, it raised questions on methodological theories and approaches to study the psychology of ancient cultures, approaches that each member of our RTG could find useful for, and consequently apply in, his/her own research.
Therefore, we very much thank Douglas Cairns for having provided such a valuable contribution to topics and questions we are dealing with in our RTG, especially in light of our pursue to examine concepts of the body and mind, hence of humans more generally, within an interdisciplinary approach and with the aim to evaluate their universal or culture-specific nature.
After the Christmas break, on the first RTG’s plenary session of 2019, our Mercator Fellow, Prof Douglas Cairns, holder of the chair of classics at the University of Edinburgh, held a lecture on mental conflict in the Homeric poems and in their later reception, especially in Eustathius’ Homeric Commentaries. Mental conflict is defined as the situation that arises when a person is subjected to conflicting motives or impulses to act. In Homer, one common way of representing mental conflict is in terms of a relation between a person and his/her psychic organs (such as, his/her thymos or heart).
Cairns presented an empirical refutation of the standard opinion, initiated by Bruno Snell in his famous book The Discovery of Mind (English translation Oxford 1953). According to Snell, Homeric man is “a battleground of arbitrary forces and uncanny powers… the Homeric man has not yet awakened to the fact that he possesses in his own soul the source of his powers.” Snell argues for a multiplicity of psychic agents that preclude a unified sense of the person as an entire agent. As Arthur Adkins summarizes, “Homeric Man … has a psychology and a physiology in which the parts are more evident than the whole” (From the Many to the One, London 1970: 26).
In contrast, Cairns claimed that the apparent multitude of psychic organs needs to be treated as a family or system that exists to represent personal agency. Moreover, Cairns highlighted that psychic organs, by metonymy (in which aspect of physical body felt to play a role in mental functioning comes to serve as ways of referring to those functions) and in metaphors (mostly personification and reification), come to represent the phenomenology of psychological processes.
Thus, even though the person’s psychic organ is involved in a situation of mental conflict, the agent, namely the real subject pondering diverse courses of action or conflicting impulses is still the person as a whole (and not one of his/her psychic organs).
In the Homeric poems, a person ponders different options and impulses within one of his/her psychic organs, or he/she can do so also without any reference to his/her psychic organs. As Cairns showed, in the contest of a person pondering within his/her psychic organs, the adverbial reference to the psychic organ is simply a way to specify that the act of pondering takes place within the mental apparatus of the person. However, a psychic organ (often thymos) can itself reflect and deliberate. In this respect, Cairns focused on Hector’s monologue before his confrontation with Achilles (Il. 22.98ff.).
This episode is introduced by a formulaic address to Hector’s thymos. Whereas for Shirley Darcus such addresses to the thymos emphasize the distinct nature of person and thymos (Psychological and Ethical Ideas: What early Greeks say, Leiden 1995: e.g.58), Cairns highlighted, in contrast, that thymos functionally serves to intensify the agent’s thoughts. In other words, the agent’s address to the thymos and the agent’s deliberation in respect or within his/her thymos indicate the same process. This holds true even when the thymos is credited with some speech. Before articulating his final resolution, Hector presents his previous thoughts and pondered options for action as suggestions voiced in conversation by his thymos: “but why has my dear thymos said this to me in conversation?” However, no actual speech is ever attributed to the thymos in this or any other Homeric passages. More plausibly, formulae like that we find here are meant to characterise the thymos as a convenient source for the rejected options. But Hector is the only agent pondering possible alternatives and eventually coming to a decision: “if I go… Polydamas will be first to put a reproach upon me … Now since by my own recklessness I ruined my people, I feel shame before the Trojans” etc. (my emphasis).
Thus, although the thymos can function as a sort of partner in an internal conversation or mental conflict, it is not conceptualized as a separated agent of speech and deliberation. As Cairns compellingly concluded, even though Hector converses with his thymos, the deliberating agent is still Hector as an entire person. We have indeed a well-integrated personality that is able to wage options, consider responsibilities and take decisions.
The second major passage Cairns focused on was the episode where Odysseus is plotting harm for the Suitors and pondering whether to kill them (Od. 20.9ff.). Here Odysseus is said to have a heart that barks within him. The doings of the heart stand in metonymy for the emotional experience with which the organ is associated. Cairns maintained that Odysseus’ barking heart is a paradigm of motivational conflict, as was already recognised by Plato. This means that even though the heart is said to bark, the entity feeling emotions is not Odysseus’ heart, but rather Odysseus himself as a whole person. After the focus on the barking heart (kardiē), the subsequent lines refer to the thymos: Odysseus’ reflection on what to do occurs in his thymos. The shifts among heart, thymos and Odysseus himself serve to intensify the agent’s mental conflict. There is no functional difference between heart and thymos, just as there is no difference in agency between thymos and Odysseus. In fact, within less than five lines Odysseus can indifferently say “my thymos pondered this in my breast” and “this other and harder thing I ponder in my breast” (my emphasis). Which clearly indicates that Odysseus’ thymos is not conceptualized as a psychic entity distinct from the person, but is the pars pro toto indicating Odysseus himself as deliberating agent.
Finally, Cairns considered some passages of Eustathius’ Homeric commentaries to show that, in contrast to modern interpretations, the Byzantine author was aware that the addressee to a certain organ by a Homeric character does not imply a primitive conceptualization of the person’s psychology as fragmented. Although psychic organs are addressed in motivational conflicts in the Homeric poems, the real agent of deliberation is still the person as a whole. As Eustathius acknowledges, Homeric addressees to psychic organs such as heart or thymos are instances of figurative language. Or, more specifically: “‘Endure my heart’ is a synecdoche for ‘you, Odysseus…’ That is why a bit later he says ‘when you thought you were going to die’, where ‘you’ is clearly Odysseus.’’ (Comm. Od. 18. 223-4 Stallbaum).
As the subsequent discussion displayed, Cairns’ presentation raised a great array of questions dealing with concepts of soul and mind in Greek and other ancient cultures, the relationship between mind and body, the study of emotions, as well as of motivational conflict in ancient languages and culture. Above all, it raised questions on methodological theories and approaches to study the psychology of ancient cultures, approaches that each member of our RTG could find useful for, and consequently apply in, his/her own research.
Therefore, we very much thank Douglas Cairns for having provided such a valuable contribution to topics and questions we are dealing with in our RTG, especially in light of our pursue to examine concepts of the body and mind, hence of humans more generally, within an interdisciplinary approach and with the aim to evaluate their universal or culture-specific nature.
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